Beijing directed COSCO to buy ships at home after US paused port fees
Facing US tariffs intended to divert ship orders, China's government-owned fleet placed a massive order with domestic yards, reinforcing subsidies through contractual demand.
Four weeks after Washington suspended its port fees on Chinese ships, COSCO Shipping placed the largest domestic vessel order in China's history, committing roughly RMB 50 billion, or about $7.1 billion, for up to 87 vessels from China State Shipbuilding Corp yards, according to Lloyd's List on December 9, 2025.
The deal came a month into a truce that was supposed to direct buyers away from Chinese hulls. Washington had spent 2025 raising the price of Chinese steel, imposing per-ton fees on Chinese-owned and Chinese-built ships at US ports starting October 14. These fees were then suspended for a year on November 10 through the Trump-Xi trade truce, as the USTR press release on November 9, 2025, recorded. The fee was designed to push owners toward other yards, but COSCO responded by buying at home.
The order spans containerships, VLCC tankers, bulk carriers, and multipurpose tonnage across six CSSC yards: Jiangnan, Dalian, Guangzhou Shipyard International, Beihai, Wuchang, and Chengxi, with Maritime Telegraph reporting the details on December 9. No Western or Korean yard seriously contended for the work, as both the buyer and builder answer to the same shareholder in Beijing.
Section 301 was the official trigger. The USTR investigation found China's maritime dominance unfair, finalized the fees in April 2025, put them into effect October 14, and paused them November 10 through November 2026; Holland & Knight summarized the sequence on November 12. Foreign owners hesitated: gCaptain observed in October 2025 that Chinese yards’ share of orders fell as non-Chinese buyers waited out the fee’s implementation. The broader motive is older: Beijing has long wanted its yards anchored by domestic demand, a goal cited word for word in USTR’s 2024 petition. A state fleet buying from home turns every yuan of subsidy into sovereign shipbuilding.
Chinese shipowners absorbed the blow. Hellenic Shipping News, on November 14, 2025, estimated they already accounted for over 65 percent of new contracts at Chinese yards as foreign buyers retreated ahead of the port-fee deadline. In dry bulk alone, Chinese owners now hold about 41 percent of the global orderbook — ahead of Greek owners — according to Xinde Marine News in July 2026.
Once the fee threat faded, the market surged. Global orders reached 1,481 ships worth $132.6 billion in the first half of 2026, near a half-year record, and Clarksons Research figures cited by Xinde Marine News on July 23 show Chinese yards captured 72 percent by tonnage — roughly 31 million CGT across 1,131 vessels. Orders at Chinese yards rose 173 percent year on year by tonnage, beating any previous full-year total, as Seatrade Maritime reported on July 24.
In the 1970s and 1980s, Japan followed the same model: MITI directed leading shipowners like Nippon Yusen and Mitsubishi to order domestically, government credit cut financing costs, and Japanese yards stayed full while the world bought Japanese steel on price. That loop ended when the yen’s late-1980s rally broke price competitiveness and Korean yards undercut Japanese yards. The difference is China controls both ends on a continental scale, and the yuan does not appreciate on Washington’s schedule.
Greek owners push back, arguing an independent owner can simply buy the cheapest compliant hull available.
Yet Greek shipowners remain the second-largest customers of Chinese bulk builders, and almost none of their bulkers are built outside China, as Xinde Marine News pointed out in July 2026.
CSSC and CSIC yards are busy through the decade, with LNG carrier backlogs stretching to 2030, according to SASAC on August 21, 2026. Slot scarcity is raising prices: foreign buyers who sat out the fee scare now find newbuild slots only for 2029 or 2030, and must pay the premium or look elsewhere. When the suspension expires in November 2026, the port fee returns to a fleet less dependent on US ports. COSCO can re-route transpacific trades through partners, while its newbuildings serve intra-Asian and Belt-and-Road trades that do not touch Long Beach. The leverage Washington aimed for dissolves into sovereign capacity China owns outright.
The foreign charterer and the mid-sized Greek or German owner bear the higher prices, facing both a steeper orderbook and a two-tier market where Chinese-built, Chinese-flagged ships enjoy financing, insurance, and berth priority within China’s sphere. CSSC’s listed yards profit by filling political orders without discounting, and COSCO strengthens its balance sheet by holding new hulls financed in renminbi. US shipyards see no gain; there is no evidence the port fee pause expanded a single American yard.
If the port fee’s renewal or lapse in November 2026 is followed by another massive domestic order package, or if Clarksons data shows Chinese owners remaining above half of Chinese yard contracts through the second half of 2026, the trend holds. If COSCO or China Merchants place significant orders at Korean yards like HD Hyundai or Samsung Heavy, it would suggest Beijing is allowing price to decide and the loop is commercial after all.
China answered Washington’s fee with a purchase order for its own. You cannot sanction a supply chain your opponent owns end to end — you only teach it to do without you.