Chevron offloads LPG ship-to-ship off Panama as canal surcharges shatter old routes

Two very large gas tankers, the Fritzi N and the Pacific Yantai, sit off Balboa on Panama's Pacific coast, chartered by Chevron, waiting to take delivery of cargoes they will never have locked through the canal themselves. The efficient move, it turns out, is to split the voyage in half at anchor.

The plan, visible in shipping charter deals seen by Bloomberg, is for smaller Panamax tankers that have already paid to pass through the locks to steam out to them and pump their liquefied petroleum gas across in mid-ocean. Then the big ships run the whole Pacific to Asia on their own bottoms (Bloomberg via gCaptain, Aug 20). What forced the trade is a number that broke last week.

A Neopanamax tanker arriving at the canal without a booked slot and asking to transit immediately paid an all-time high of $4.6 million for the jump, Bloomberg reported on August 20. For scale, the entire Panama Canal tolls for a large container ship usually run well under $2 million; the $4 million-plus sums now appearing are pure queue-jumping premiums, bid in the canal's auction system by operators whose time is worth more than the fee. In April, one container line paid about $4 million for the same privilege, The Guardian noted on August 21. These are prices extracted from whoever is in the biggest hurry.

Chevron is not in the biggest hurry, exactly. It is in a trade whose economics flipped underneath it. Roughly 60 percent of American LPG exports have gone to Asia so far this year, up from 55 percent across all of 2025, pulled east by the Iran war rerouting Middle Eastern supply and pushing Asian buyers toward Gulf Coast propane and butane, according to Kpler data cited by Bloomberg on August 20. More of the trade than ever depends on crossing the Pacific, and the crossing runs through a waterway rationing itself against a drought.

On Thursday the Panama Canal Authority cut daily transit slots for September as El Niño conditions drag down Gatun Lake, and officials told Al Jazeera and The Guardian on August 21 that further restrictions are possible depending on rainfall.

The wide Neopanamax tankers and the older, narrower Panamax tankers use different lock complexes, and traders who spoke to Bloomberg on August 20 said the congestion and pricing pain have landed almost entirely on the wide ones, with Panamax rates rising far less. So put the cargo on a cheap-to-transit small ship, pay its modest toll, then hand the molecules to the big ship on the far side.

The big vessel burns no slot, pays no record fee, and still crosses the Pacific at Neopanamax speed and efficiency. What Chevron loses is custody simplicity, schedule certainty and a margin for error, because pumping refrigerated pressurized gas between two moving hulls offshore is among the riskier things two tankers can do together.

The regulators know it

That risk is not hypothetical, and Panama's own regulators know it. Panama's Maritime Authority said last year, in a Reuters photo caption from May 2025, that it would reinforce controls on ship-to-ship operations by Panamanian-flagged vessels after a rise in dark-fleet transfers used to dodge sanctions and environmental rules. The same technique that lets sanctioned Iranian crude change flags invisibly is now letting legitimate American cooking gas skip a queue. Regulators face an awkward choice: police a practice that is suddenly mainstream commerce for blue-chip shippers, or let the safety regime stretch to accommodate them. Panama's government also collects the canal's revenue, which counsels restraint in cracking down.

The long way around Africa

The closest fit is the Cape of Good Hope detours after the Red Sea attacks: Suez pricing pushed ships the long way around Africa and freight rates simply absorbed weeks of extra voyage time.

But that detour added distance while leaving everything else intact; there is no way around Panama's geography that does not add ten thousand miles and a month.

So instead of lengthening the route, the trade is shortening the ship.

The canal's own history argues the other way. During the 2023-24 drought the authority cut slots deeply, the backlog cleared when rains returned, and auction premiums collapsed. If El Niño disappoints, the workaround could look expensive within a quarter, which is presumably why Chevron is chartering into it deal by deal rather than rebuilding its logistics around it.

Owners of Panamax LPG tonnage suddenly hold the scarcer asset, since their narrow ships can cross cheaply and their cargo can be sold twice, once as a freight leg and once as a transfer service. Shipbrokers and marine warranty surveyors who certify offshore cargo moves get new billings. The losers are the Panama Canal Authority, which is forfeiting the fat Neopanamax tolls to its own pricing, and whoever ultimately buys the cooking gas in Asia, because every extra handling step adds cost that flows downstream into the September propane contract.

Ship-to-ship transfers work at this scale only while a handful of players do them quietly; if the Gulf Coast-to-Asia trade routinized them, Balboa's anchorage would fill, Panamax availability would tighten until its advantage vanished, and the saving would compete itself away. Confirming evidence would be more Neopanamax bookings showing Balboa or Atlantic-side Cristobal as delivery points over the next few weeks. Breaking evidence would be the canal authority restoring slots quickly on heavier rains, or the Maritime Authority imposing hard restrictions on offshore transfers that scare charterers back into the auction queue (Reuters, May 23, 2025; Al Jazeera, Aug 21).

There is a slower pressure under all of this that neither the drought nor the war created. The canal sells passage with freshwater it does not price, and every year the climate makes that water scarce, the gap between what shippers pay and what the passage costs grows until someone invents a way to stop paying it.

Chevron's floating transfer off Balboa is what that invention looks like when it arrives: not a new canal, not a new treaty, just two ships rafted together outside the locks, doing business the waterway was built to monopolize. The canal kept the queue. The trade kept the cargo.