Russian refinery strikes cut Central Asian and Afghan fuel supplies sharply

In June, Russian jet-fuel shipments by rail to Central Asia and Afghanistan collapsed by more than ninety percent against May, to just 3,800 tons, while gasoline deliveries fell by a third to 99,300 tons, according to figures Reuters reported on July 13 via Global Banking and Finance Review.

No officials in Dushanbe or Bishkek took direct action against Russian refineries, but they are paying the price of the war at the pump, in currencies that lose ground in the face of rising costs.

The immediate cause is Ukrainian drone attacks, but the consequence stretches well beyond Russia’s domestic market. Central Asian states closed their own refineries decades ago and ceded supply to Russia, making each new strike on Russian infrastructure a blow to their own fuel access within weeks. This summer’s attacks have made the extent of that dependency impossible to ignore.

Strikes in recent months have targeted facilities deep inside Russia. Al Jazeera reported on August 21 that a unit at Ufa was hit on August 19 during repairs from an earlier attack, while EnergyNewsBeat noted on August 22 that the Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez plant was struck on August 21, more than 1,500 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

Moscow’s response has favored restrictions over supply. Bloomberg reported on July 2 that gasoline exports were halted as of April 1, with exceptions only for intergovernmental deals, a measure Caspian Post wrote on July 30 was tightened further in late July to cover even major producers.

Kyrgyzstan relies on imports for about 1.2 million tons of its 1.6 million ton yearly motor fuel consumption, almost entirely transported by rail from Russia, the Times of Central Asia reported on July 7.

Tajikistan, too, lacks significant refining capacity and depends on bilateral imports from Moscow, according to the same regional weekly on September 5, 2025.

Signs of aggravation are visible in Russia’s own market. Izvestia, as cited by I News in mid-August, found gasoline and diesel at only 28 percent of stations nationwide in mid-August, down from 41 percent a month earlier, and reported that major chains had capped purchases at 50 to 60 liters.

Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilyov maintained to I News in August that fuel remained available "everywhere", even as he acknowledged growing queues.

When forced to choose between relieving pressure at home and meeting export contracts, the Russian government will always act to calm Moscow’s markets first.

Clients to the south are adapting quickly. Kyrgyzstan’s government imposed fixed benchmark import prices in late May—AI-92 gasoline at $860 per ton—and implemented subsidies to bridge any gap through September 30, the Times of Central Asia reported on July 7. Bishkek also lifted restrictions on road imports to allow trucking from any neighboring supplier.

Tajikistan’s energy minister told Reuters on July 13 via Global Banking and Finance Review that his country holds about 60 days of reserves and is in talks with neighbors to secure future supply.

Bloomberg reported on July 2 that the price of AI-92 in Uzbekistan had already risen by nearly twelve percent in just the first weeks of summer.

The paratroopers

In January 2022, Kazakhstan removed a price cap on liquefied petroleum gas in Mangystau province. Protests over the resulting spike in fuel prices quickly escalated into riots, deposed the government, and only ended with the arrival of Russian paratroopers. Fuel costs remain a uniquely sensitive issue in Central Asia; the events of 2022 showed regional governments that queues at filling stations can turn to crowds at the palace more quickly than any security apparatus can contain.

Kazakhstan presents a counter-argument with certain advantages. Its refineries at Pavlodar, Shymkent, and Atyrau make the country largely self-sufficient in gasoline, and Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov stated that intergovernmental agreements guarantee exemptions from Russia’s export ban, according to Central Asia’s English-language weekly on September 5, 2025. Kyrgyzstan’s official view, in the same report, claims its 93 percent share of Russian-supplied fuel continues to flow uninterrupted under such agreements. Yet, as the June rail arrivals show, quotas on paper cannot guarantee volume when actual trains are arriving lighter.

Unexpected winners have emerged. Rosneft alone supplied nearly half of Russian gasoline exports to the region in the first half of the year, Reuters reported on July 13 via Global Banking and Finance Review, concentrating the impact wherever one firm decides its domestic commitments outweigh exports. Meanwhile, Russia is itself importing: Reuters reported on August 19 via the Economic Times that some 270,000 tons of refined fuel arrived via ship-to-ship transfers off Malaysia, South Korea, and elsewhere in August, after none in July—about a third sourced from India. That the world’s biggest crude exporter is buying gasoline from its own sanctions-skirting customers underscores the losses at Russian refineries.

The financial consequences ripple outward. Kyrgyzstan’s treasury covers import subsidies pegged to global prices it cannot control. Tajikistan faces the risk of running dry, with just sixty days’ inventory if talks falter. Uzbek motorists pay rising prices at the pump, and subsidies mean less state money for other needs. Profits go to those holding surplus product near the region—Kazakh refiners and traders orchestrating lucrative, discreet ship-to-ship transfers.

The current reading holds if Moscow keeps the producer-level export ban through autumn maintenance season and Central Asian rail arrivals remain low when harvest fuel demand peaks. If Russian units are repaired swiftly and domestic inventories rebuilt, bans could be lifted in time to refill regional shipments before winter, breaking the current pattern.

Ukrainian drones targeted Russia’s war economy but disrupted a broader, longstanding arrangement: Central Asian dependence on Russian fuel in exchange for political quiet.

The true cost lands not on Moscow or Kyiv, but on the treasuries of Bishkek and Dushanbe, left with only subsidies, rationing, or a difficult search for new suppliers as options.